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THE CASE FOR RESTRICTING DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION: THE UNDEVELOPED ARGUMENTS, 
FROM THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM TO THE 
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT 
David Crump∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Diversity jurisdiction is an idea whose time has come—and gone.  In its 
present form, it serves its alleged purposes so inconsistently that its benefits are 
minimal, if they exist at all.1 And the costs that it imposes are significant. The 
traditional arguments for and against diversity are well known, but the traditional 
arguments against it actually understate its disadvantages. Therefore, the purpose of 
this Article is to construct the arguments against diversity that traditional 
scholarship has left underdeveloped. 
The first section of the Article sketches the traditional arguments, both pro and 
con. This section is brief, because the objective is merely to provide background 
for the real work of the Article. The second and third sections carry on this work by 
discussing the underdeveloped arguments against diversity jurisdiction. In the 
second section, the Article shows that diversity creates perverse incentives, which 
the traditional arguments do not fully explain.  These phenomena include a curious 
kind of race to the bottom that I call the “Ice Bowl Effect,” as well as a motivation 
toward the joinder of unnecessary parties, that results in “Harassing the Little 
Guy.”  Diversity also causes increases in costs which benefit what I call “Passive-
Aggressive Litigants,” as well as biases that result in a “Tilted Playing Field.”2  
In addition to these incentives, diversity creates distortion that the traditional 
scholarship has not fully explained, and these distortions are the subject of the third 
section.  Diversity results in a large percentage of removals, which create what I 
call a “Twilight Zone Effect” when a case is handled by two different kinds of trial 
courts.  Furthermore, in spite of the policy underlying the Erie Doctrine,3 diversity 
still results in substitution of federal judges’ preferences for state policy, sometimes 
deliberately—an effect that I shall illustrate as “The Substitution of Philosophy for 
Law.”  
A final section sets out the Author’s conclusions.  These include the 
proposition that today, in the twenty-first century, there are more reasons than ever 
to authorize diversity jurisdiction more selectively.  The arguments may not 
persuade every reader toward abolition of diversity, which arguably would be a 
drastic change, but perhaps they justify revision and retrenchment.  Furthermore, 
the negative effects should be taken into account by courts whenever policy 
arguments properly influence decisions. 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ John B. Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  A.B. Harvard College; 
J.D. University of Texas School of Law.  
 1. See DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2008). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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II.  TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DIVERSITY 
A.  In Favor of Diversity:  The Continuing Justifications 
The reasons for the diversity provision in the Constitution are shrouded in 
mystery.  The same is true for the initial statutory grant by the first Congress.4  To 
fill this void, commentators have suggested several policies that diversity 
jurisdiction allegedly advances.  Each one probably played a part in the beginning, 
and each presumably contributes to the retention of diversity jurisdiction today. 
First and foremost, there is the theory that diversity jurisdiction serves to 
counteract local prejudice.5  In other words, diversity is aimed at the fear that a 
South Carolinian who sues a Rhode Islander in a Rhode Island court will encounter 
that state’s protectionism of its own citizens.  In fact, James Madison referred to 
“the occlusions of the Courts of Justice” as one of the motivating factors for the 
Constitutional Convention.6 
The question remains, however, whether diversity jurisdiction actually has 
much effect in serving this policy.  The complete diversity requirement means that 
it is easy for a claimant to destroy federal jurisdiction by framing a suit 
strategically, and thus it results in the denial of a federal forum precisely when the 
policy of minimizing local prejudice would seem strongest—if indeed local 
prejudice is really the concern.7  Furthermore, the larger question is whether 
protection against local prejudice is needed today in the same way in which it was 
when diversity was adopted.  Today, communication is instantaneous, and mobility 
is national if not international.  To put it another way, a New Yorker and a 
Houstonian may have more in common, and more affinity for each other, than 
either would have for a citizen of the same state with a different social status or 
lifestyle.8 
Second, some scholars believe that diversity jurisdiction was designed to 
protect commercial interests.9  The difference between states inhabited by creditors 
and those inhabited by debtors was one of the major divisions that had to be 
overcome at the Constitutional Convention.10  As with the local prejudice rationale, 
however, one can question whether diversity jurisdiction achieves the result, or 
whether it is needed to do so in today’s climate.  
A third rationale for diversity was the expectation that the federal courts 
generally would furnish a superior forum.  As one Congressional report puts it, the 
argument was that “the federal courts being better than the state, it was preferable 
to route as many cases into the former as possible.”11  But the question remains: 
“better” by what measure?  Just as a small claims court might not be better for 
                                                                                                     
 4. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 194-95. 
 5. See id.  See also Abolition of Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, H.R. REP. NO. 95-893 (1978), 
excerpted in CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 230-31 [hereinafter Abolition of Diversity].  
 6. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 15 (1966). 
 7. See supra note 1. 
 8. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Litigation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 119, 143-45 
(2003). 
 9. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 194-95. 
 10. MADISON, supra note 6, at 15 (referring to “interferences” by some states that affected “the 
rights of other States, relatively Creditor”). 
 11. Authority cited in supra note 5, reprinted in CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 195.  
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adjudicating a multi-million dollar claim, or vice versa, federal courts might not be 
superior for the resolution of controversies of average size that depend purely upon 
state law. 
A fourth rationale, more recently articulated, is that giving litigants a “choice” 
of forum is a desirable thing.  One of the most effective opponents of abolishing 
diversity was the late Phoenix attorney John P. Frank, who told Congress, “The 
proposal to abolish the diversity jurisdiction is, from the standpoint of the bar, 
approximately as popular as tuberculosis in a hospital.”12  Frank explained his 
“choice” theory as follows: 
The fact of the matter is that the existence of the option is advantageous to counsel 
and to litigants wherever it may exist. . . . 
. . . [D]uring the period of Judge Ritter’s life, lawyers in Salt Lake City 
tended to move toward the State side where they could [to] avoid the problems of 
dealing with Judge Ritter. . . .  
. . . Since Senator Percy had taken over and improved merit selection in 
Chicago, . . . [t]he Federal district courts in Chicago have been vastly improved.  
The lawyers want the option, where possible, in getting before those admirable 
high-quality judges where they can. . . . 13 
But this “choice-is-good” argument is transparently lacking in merit, in spite of 
its widespread acceptance.  The traditional arguments overlook the fact that 
litigants  do not prefer a fair forum, or for that matter a theoretically better one.  
Someone gets the final choice, whether state or federal.  If that litigant has a bad 
case and will be advantaged by an arbitrary judge, that is the direction a strong-
stomached lawyer will choose.  Thus, not only is the choice-of-forum argument 
misplaced, but, actually, its opposite is true.  It furnishes an argument against 
diversity, one that this Article will develop below.14 
Fifth, there is the argument that diversity jurisdiction brings about a cross-
fertilization of the federal and state bench and bar.  As Frank put it, “The 
educational value of having two systems in interaction” is a “great plus.”15  The 
federal bar should not become “elitist.”  But as Professor Charles Alan Wright 
responded, “I do not think that is any longer a problem.  I think it may very well 
have been a problem in [the past].”16  
A final argument in favor of diversity is that, allegedly, people like it.  Frank 
pointed out that abolition of diversity was “opposed by the appropriate governing 
bodies” of many state bars and supported “by not one single state bar.”17  He 
added, “The first great value of diversity is its disposition of something on the 
                                                                                                     
 12. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
230-46 (1978) (testimony of John P. Frank), reprinted in CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 231 
[hereinafter Frank Testimony]. 
 13. Id. at 231-32. 
 14. See infra Part IIIA. 
 15. See Frank Testimony, supra note 12, at 231. 
 16. Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:  Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389, and H.R. 9622 
Before the Subcomm. On Improvements in Judicial Machinery. 95th Cong. 44-63 (1978) (testimony of 
Professor Charles Alan Wright), reprinted in CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 232 [hereinafter Wright 
Testimony]. 
 17. See Frank Testimony, supra note 12, at 231. 
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order of almost 30,000 disputes a year to the general satisfaction of those who need 
their disposition.”18  But there is a great deal of room to question whether the 
actions of the appropriate governing bodies were either informed or representative, 
just as there is room to suppose that many people—citizens and lawyers alike—
dislike federal intervention into matters that they regard as subjects of state law. 
B.  Against Diversity: The Traditional Arguments 
Just as there are traditional arguments for the retention of diversity, there are 
traditional arguments for its abolition.  The issue surfaces periodically in Congress.  
The best known legislative report accompanied House Bill 9622, which “would 
have abolished diversity jurisdiction between citizens of different states.”19  The 
arguments, like those in favor of diversity, still resonate today. 
The first argument is that abolition would preserve a federal forum for those 
with federal claims.20  At the same time, abolition would add only negligibly to the 
case load of state courts.  “Essentially, 32,000 cases pending before 400 Federal 
district judges will cause few problems when allocated among 6,000 state judges of 
general jurisdiction.”21  The conference of state chief justices passed a resolution 
observing that “state courts were ‘able and willing’ to assume all or part of the 
Federal diversity jurisdiction.”22  As Professor Wright put it, “I am concerned with 
people who want to take advantage of laws that Congress has passed in the last 15 
years, giving rights that did not exist . . . .  I want them to be able to get to trial.”23  
Federal courts offer no special advantages in deciding state-law cases, and “perhaps 
no other major class of cases has a weaker claim on federal judicial resources.”24 
Second, there is the argument that diversity jurisdiction is inefficient.  Federal 
courts have expertise in federal issues, or so the argument goes.  “Thus, diversity 
jurisdiction forces federal courts to decide issues on which they have no special 
expertise at the expense of tasks they can perform significantly better than state 
courts.”25  
Third, there is the argument that diversity jurisdiction is no longer needed 
because the world has changed since the United States’ founding.  Thus, the report 
on House Bill 9622 argued: 
[T]he original reasons for diversity jurisdiction have long since disappeared.  At 
present, there is little evidence that the State courts are less qualified or, due to 
latent prejudice against out-of-staters, unable to render fair and impartial justice in 
these cases.  Since Federal juries are now drawn from the same registration or 
voter lists as State jurors . . . , arguments that Federal juries are less biased than 
their State counterparts are insubstantial. . . .  
Today, the United States is a more mobile society than that of the First 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. 
 19. Abolition of Diversity, supra note 5, at 230-31. 
 20. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 100, 102-07, 119-21 
(summarizing arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction). 
 21. Abolition of Diversity, supra note 5, at 230-31. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Wright Testimony, supra note 16, at 232. 
 24. See Kramer, supra note 20, at 102. 
 25. Id. at 104. 
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Congress or even the 80th Congress. . . . [C]ommunications are made easy by 
telephone, telegraph and television.  Technological change [and] education . . . 
[have reduced] the risk of prejudice against out-of-staters. . . . 26 
The report concluded with the observation, “The federal courts are a scarce 
resource and should be treated as such.”27 
The argument against these first three justifications is straightforward.  It is 
that local prejudice, allegedly, still exists.  And if it does, then counteracting bias in 
favor of in-staters is a proper purpose of diversity jurisdiction.  If this purpose is 
achieved, the federal courts may actually be more efficient than abolitionists 
recognize at achieving the Founders’ goals.  Evaluation of the balance between 
these arguments depends upon whether one believes that local prejudice is a greater 
problem than the difficulties created by diversity jurisdiction.  The thesis that this 
Article will develop is that the harm done by diversity greatly exceeds any putative 
benefits, and, in addition, that diversity does not really do much to counteract local 
prejudice anyway. 
The fourth argument for abolishing diversity is based upon the enormous and 
complicated body of jurisdictional law that is necessary to maintain it.28  Frank’s 
testimony was that he remembered “only one case in his own practice in which 
there was any serious question about whether there was diversity.”29  This is an 
astounding statement.  My own experience as a professor, for whom litigation is a 
sometime sideline, is that diversity has occasioned many disputes that vastly 
increased costs and delay.30  As Professor Wright put the matter, “Litigants are 
making mistakes repeatedly on whether or not there is federal jurisdiction.  Even 
when it turns out there has not been a mistake, judges are having to take the time to 
[decide] . . . whether diversity exists.”31  Furthermore, often the matter is not one of 
mistakes by litigants, but instead, it is caused by gaps in the law. 
The fifth traditional argument is that diversity jurisdiction is a source of 
friction between state and federal courts, and that efforts to minimize federal 
interference create complex procedural doctrines that increase the costs and delay 
inherent in litigating diversity cases.32  Thus, the Erie Doctrine requires federal 
courts to engage in what are straightforwardly called “Erie educated guesses” about 
the meaning of state law.33 
Again, the counter to these abolitionist arguments is that they are overstated 
and that the benefits of diversity jurisdiction outweigh them.  There the matter lies, 
dependent upon the beholder’s eye for the weight of each side.  But the point of 
this Article is that there are further arguments against diversity, and that they 
outweigh the asserted benefits. 
                                                                                                     
 26. Abolition of Diversity, supra note 5, at 230. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Kramer, supra note 20, at 103-07. 
 29. Wright Testimony, supra note 16, at 232. 
 30. See infra Part IV B (discussing the Author’s experience in removed cases). 
 31. Wright Testimony, supra note 16, at 232.  
 32. Kramer, supra note 20, at 103-07. 
 33. CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 266-69. 
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III.  BAD INCENTIVES AS NEW ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY  
I see two kinds of arguments against diversity that the traditional debate leaves 
underdeveloped.  One is that diversity jurisdiction creates bad incentives for the 
litigants.  This argument is the subject of the present section.  A later section will 
feature the other type of argument:  that diversity distorts the substantive litigation. 
Perhaps the most powerful argument against diversity comes from recognizing 
the wrong-headedness of Frank’s choice-of-forum argument.  In most instances, 
only one party has a choice.  And in many instances, one party or the other will 
benefit more from increased cost, delay, and bad judging.  As I shall discuss below, 
the choice provided by diversity is actually a dysfunctional thing, because the 
choice often will be strategically dictated by a race to the bottom.  This is the first 
of the perverse incentives that I perceive. 
Also, the traditional arguments against diversity fail to emphasize the fact that 
diversity jurisdiction often creates an incentive toward a kind of “harassment of the 
little guy.”  This phenomenon is a consequence of the rule that incomplete diversity 
is not diversity, so that the joinder of a local citizen defeats removal.  Lawyers use 
this technique to manipulate jurisdiction, and they do so lawfully, but at great cost, 
by unnecessarily joining “little guy” locals from whom they do not, in reality, seek 
to recover. 
The traditional arguments also fail to explain how diversity can tilt the playing 
field.  The transition to federal court almost always raises the cost of litigation.  But 
raising the cost is not always a neutral effect.  Passive-aggressive litigants have an 
incentive to remove because they benefit from increased cost.  Diversity thus 
creates a dysfunctional kind of bias that is unrelated to the kinds of bias that federal 
jurisdiction is supposed to create or oppose.  In general, this cost effect hurts parties 
with the burden of proof who need remedies against opposing parties.  In other 
words, it often hurts individual plaintiffs.  
The subsections of this Article that follow will develop these arguments. 
A.  The Ice Bowl Effect:  A Race to the Bottom 
The negative result of Frank’s choice principle can be illustrated by a famous 
football game played four decades ago.  I call the analogy the “Ice Bowl Effect.”  
The temperature, at that game, was minus 13 degrees. The wind chill was an 
amazing minus 46 degrees: too cold, it would seem, for football.34 But it was under 
those conditions, at Lambeau Field in Green Bay, Wisconsin, that the Green Bay 
Packers and the Dallas Cowboys played the 1967 National Football League 
Championship.  Green Bay won a squeaker, by the score of 21 to 17.  The game 
was said by some to be “the greatest” ever played, and today it is known as “The 
Ice Bowl.”35 
Whatever it was, the Ice Bowl was not football. The Cowboys may have been 
the better team, but if so, the ice prevented the score from showing it. The field’s 
very expensive heating system failed due to the cold (although some said that 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Packers.com, Gameday: December 31, 1967, http://www.packers.com/gameday/1967/12-
31/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). 
 35. Id. 
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legendary Packers coach Vince Lombardi had turned it off).36 The officials could 
not use whistles to stop play, because they were frozen. One fan died of exposure; 
the marching band canceled its performance after blood congealed on the faces of 
the musicians; and Packers fans several times leaned over the front row to unplug 
the heated benches upon which the Cowboys sat.37 
Would anyone ever want to play football under these conditions?  Actually, 
yes.   The Green Bay Packers would. 
Since the Ice Bowl, there have been several more frigid playoff games at 
Lambeau Field. Sometimes, snow whitens the grass and obscures yard markers at 
least temporarily (not to mention its obscuring of receivers and thrown footballs). 
The result is not always a Packer victory, but it is always a Packer advantage.38 The 
forum (Lambeau Field, that is) always introduces elements of arbitrariness and 
distortion, but these elements favor the Packers. The Packers want a field on which 
the game of football is distorted, because this particular kind of distortion increases 
the odds that they will win. 
The Packers’ preference for Ice Bowl conditions is an example of the public 
choice phenomenon known as the “Race to the Bottom.”39 Sometimes, public 
choice creates perverse incentives toward alternatives that distort. The Ice Bowl has 
a lesson to teach about forum contests.  It provides an analogy for one of the less 
attractive features of diversity jurisdiction.  
To understand how the Ice Bowl resembles the effect of diversity, imagine a 
litigant who has the choice of litigating before Judge Goode or Judge Baad. Judge 
Goode sets aside his personal biases, addresses issues promptly, follows the law, 
and deals courteously with the litigants. Judge Baad gives free reign to his 
prejudices, delays decisions so as to increase expense, does not care much whether 
he follows the law, and is abusive of counsel. One might expect that it would be 
more pleasant to try a case in front of Judge Goode than Judge Baad. Therefore, 
John Frank’s “choice” theory would predict that the parties, both of them, would 
exercise every available option toward the same end: to get their case out of Judge 
Baad’s court and into Judge Goode’s.  But is the choice theory correct? 
The obvious answer shown by the Green Bay Packer’s choice of forum is, “no, 
the ‘choice-is-good’ theory is not correct.” Imagine that one of the litigants has a 
case that is weak. It is weak factually, and it is weak legally. On a level playing 
field, the lawyer with the weak case is more likely to lose. An arbitrary, incendiary, 
lawless judge helps that party. The kinship between the Green Bay Packers and 
lawyers with relatively weak cases is that both benefit from the race to the bottom.  
Thus the lawyer with the ability to get the case in front of Judge Baad will do so, if 
winning the race to the bottom increases the likelihood of winning the case. 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. The replica of the Ice Bowl played between the New York Giants and the Packers during the 
playoffs of 2007 resulted in a victory by the Giants, but the field conditions undoubtedly helped the 
Packers. 
 39. See Wikipedia, Race to the Bottom, http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/race_to_the_bottom (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2009).  The term refers most often when economic competition between states or 
nations causes undue dismantling of humanitarian standards.  It fits this situation as well, however, 
because of its origin in game theory.  Id. 
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Among other errors, the choice-is-good theory tacitly assumes that both parties 
get to make the decision. But the assumption is incorrect.  Sometimes the plaintiff 
can choose the forum, and sometimes the defendant can do so.  When both 
disagree, obviously, only one can decide.  The plaintiff sometimes can craft the 
litigation so that it is not removable, and in that situation, the plaintiff makes the 
choice.40 If the case cannot be structured so that it prevents removal, the defendant 
has the controlling choice.  The choice-is-good theory builds upon a fallacy by 
assuming that the choice will be made in the most noble way possible.  Like the 
Packers, lawyers want to win, even if they have losing cases; and they will race to 
the bottom, if their choice is the dominant one and if choosing the worst forum will 
help them to win. 
This phenomenon, the race to the bottom, is inherent in diversity jurisdiction. 
The traditional arguments against diversity do not effectively answer the choice-is-
good argument. They often fail to point out that the choice is one-sided.  And they 
fail to observe that choice is a bad thing when it creates preferences analogous to 
those of the Packers for the Ice Bowl. 
B. Harassing the Little Guy:  How Lawyers Manipulate  
Jurisdiction by Joining Unnecessary Parties 
This next point is closely related to the Ice Bowl analogy. The “race to the 
bottom” argument means that litigants engage in forum shopping that is not 
designed to find the “best” forum, but rather to win, even by distorting the playing 
field. The next point is that this forum shopping takes the form of tailoring the 
litigation so that it does, or does not, fit the diversity jurisdiction, depending upon 
which outcome is desired. And the main method of tailoring the litigation is to join 
(or refrain from joining) marginal defendants, not for the purpose of recovering 
from them on the merits, but solely to create or destroy diversity.41 The result is a 
mass of wasteful add-on suits against local citizens who are not really the alleged 
malefactors, or as the phenomenon might be called, “harassing the little guy.” 
Here is how the strategy of manipulating diversity by harassing the little guy 
works.  Imagine a plaintiff who has been injured in a bus accident. The plaintiff, let 
us say, is a local citizen, but the bus company, which is the target defendant, is a 
citizen of another state. If the plaintiff sues only the bus company, the suit is 
removable to federal court (or can be filed there).42 But assume that the plaintiff 
believes that the better strategy—the more favorable forum, with a higher 
likelihood of a big plaintiff’s verdict—is the state court. The plaintiff, then, casts 
about for someone else who can be joined, a local citizen, who can be used solely 
for the purpose of destroying diversity. This person may be the bus driver, for 
example, or a local scheduler or tour company, or someone else involved in the 
                                                                                                     
 40. This is done by wasteful joinder that harasses marginal defendants.  See infra Part III B. 
 41. Destruction of diversity occurs when co-citizens are ostensibly adverse, or in other words, when 
there is a party from the same State as another that is on the opposite side of the “v.”  This is a very old 
rule that results from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the diversity statute.  See, e.g., Strawbridge 
v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).  Whatever principles underlay this dubious interpretation of 
ambiguous language apparently were formed without regard to the resulting strategy of joining marginal 
defendants to retain litigation in state court.   
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2008) dictates this result. 
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accident. The plaintiff then strategically joins this person as a defendant, in addition 
to the bus company, even though the local person has only derivative liability, if 
any—or is insolvent, or is unlikely to be held liable at all.43 The plaintiff has 
succeeded, now, in destroying diversity and ensuring that the case must be heard in 
state court.44 Unfortunately, the plaintiff also (1) has succeeded in bringing in an 
additional party for a reason unrelated to the merits, (2) perhaps has involved a 
second insurer, (3) probably has required a second defense lawyer, and (4) 
undoubtedly has increased the cost of litigation, all without enhancing the quality 
of the decision on the merits. In summary, diversity jurisdiction motivates lawyers 
to sue little-guy defendants against whom they have no desire to recover: 
defendants they otherwise would not sue. 
As an aside, it ought to be added that the complete diversity requirement, 
which is the driving force behind this strategy, is itself inconsistent with the alleged 
purpose behind the diversity jurisdiction. That is to say, if diversity is designed to 
counteract local prejudice, the complete diversity requirement defeats the purpose. 
The reason is easy to illustrate with an example. Imagine that a citizen of Arkansas 
sues two defendants—a citizen of Arkansas and a citizen of Vermont—in an 
Arkansas state court. That is, the Arkansan sues a co-citizen Southerner and also 
joins a Northerner, from a distant state. If local prejudice is a reality, we can expect 
the two Arkansans to gang up on the Vermonter, even though they ostensibly are 
opponents.  Theoretically, local prejudice should be at its most virulent in this 
situation, assuming local prejudice is real. The plaintiff’s final argument will be, 
“the Vermonter did it, and I now realize that the evidence shows my fellow 
Arkansan to be blameless,” while the Arkansan defendant, joining forces with the 
plaintiff, will argue, “this poor plaintiff is badly hurt and deserves huge damages, 
but not from me, because it’s all because of the fault of that bad Vermonter.” The 
upshot is, if local prejudice is a real phenomenon, it is a greater threat in cases of 
minimal diversity, not a lesser one.45 The complete diversity requirement defeats 
the policy that supposedly justifies diversity jurisdiction.  It provides strong 
evidence that our system does not really believe the local prejudice argument. 
And our system encourages shenanigans that manipulate diversity. Imagine a 
well-connected attorney who helped the local federal judge get his job. Perhaps this 
well-connected lawyer may have persuaded the state’s senior senator to 
recommend the federal judge and thus engineered the federal judge’s appointment, 
ensuring the federal judge’s everlasting gratitude. In the bus accident case 
hypothesized above, this well-connected attorney’s strategy would be to sue the 
out-of-state bus company alone, being careful not to join any local citizens.46 This 
strategy would allow the case to be filed in the friendly federal judge’s court. But 
next, imagine the opposite.  
Imagine another well-connected plaintiff’s lawyer, who contributed an 
enormous amount to the state judge’s re-election and served as the state judge’s 
campaign manager, again ensuring gratitude—but this time on the part of the state 
                                                                                                     
 43. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 196 (explaining these tactics). 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2008). 
 45. See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 195-96 (explaining this phenomenon). 
 46. Id. at 196. 
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judge. This well-connected lawyer will sue the out-of-state bus company as the real 
target but will also join the bus driver as an additional defendant, because the bus 
driver is a local citizen. This tactic destroys diversity and prevents removal.47 The 
factor that makes the difference is the joinder of a party who makes no difference 
to the expected recovery, except for destroying diversity. In other words, the race-
to-the-bottom, Ice Bowl strategy motivates lawyers toward tactics that harass little 
guys and cause significant waste. 
Sometimes, the defendant can counter this tactic with a claim of “fraudulent 
joinder.” That is, the defendant can remove the suit anyway and argue that the local 
citizen should be disregarded,48 as a party “collusively made”49 for the purpose of 
destroying diversity. But the law makes this fraudulent-joinder tactic very difficult 
to use, because the defendant must convince the federal court to a legal certainty 
that there is “no possibility” of “a cause of action against the defendant.”50 Any 
ambiguity in the facts means that the local citizen stays in the suit and destroys 
diversity. In the bus accident case, for example, it usually will be impossible for the 
defendant to carry the burden of demonstrating to a legal certainty that the bus 
driver had nothing to do with the event, even if the plaintiff’s lawyer has not 
included the driver for any substantive purpose, but only to destroy diversity. The 
frequency of fraudulent joinder arguments,51 however, by defendants who want to 
remove to federal court, is both a source of waste itself and a testament to the tactic 
of harassing the little guy and the Ice Bowl Effect. 
C.  Raising the Cost:  How Passive-Aggressive Litigants Change the Battlefield 
The next point is simple. Federal court is more expensive than state court. 
There are many reasons why this is so. Professor Burt Neuborne, in praising the 
federal courts, provides a way of understanding one major reason: the multiple law 
clerks assigned to a federal judge. 
Federal clerks . . . are chosen from among the most promising recent law school 
graduates for one- to two-year terms.  State trial clerks, on the other hand, when 
available at all, tend to be either career bureaucrats or patronage employees and 
may lack both the ability and dedication of their federal counterparts . . . . Thus, 
even if state and federal judges were of equal native ability, the advantages 
enjoyed by federal judges would probably result in a higher level of 
performance.52  
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. Chicago, Burlington, & Quinay Ry. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413 (1911).  This doctrine appears 
to have been first recognized by the Supreme Court in this case, although the Court there found it 
inapplicable. 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2008).  Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969), contains a 
widely-cited application of the collusive parties statute. 
 50. E.g., Henderson v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 51. A Westlaw search for the combined terms “fraudulent joinder” and “diversity” in the “All 
Cases” database produces more than 3000 opinions. 
 52. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122-23 (1977).  Neuborne asserts 
that the “technical competence” of federal courts is “superior,” a conclusion that this Article treats as 
dubious.  Id. at 1124. 
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This description makes federal judges’ reliance on law clerks seem an 
unalloyed positive. But the literature relating to law clerks is more mixed. Law 
clerks are not appointed by the president or confirmed by the senate, yet they exert 
significant and unpredictable pressure on outcomes.53 In a later section of this 
Article, I will argue, contrary to Professor Neuborne’s theory, that law clerks are 
likely to precipitate bad decision-making.54  But for now, the point is that law 
clerks increase costs for litigants.  One result of the multiplication of effort is that 
purely procedural motions get greater attention. Expensive battles over issues 
unrelated to the merits proliferate.  
In such circumstances, one can foresee that the result may not be “a higher 
level of performance,” as Professor Neuborne concludes.  A party wishing to resort 
to the courts at reasonable expense, in a suit that is not a first-impression landmark, 
might consider the resulting unpredictability, delay, and expense to be a negative 
rather than a positive attribute of the federal forum. Such a party may prefer to have 
the suit handled by the “career bureaucrat” that Professor Neuborne so disdains: a 
person who has seen these issues before, knows how they have been resolved in the 
past, and can channel the litigation to resolve them efficiently. Professor 
Neuborne’s arguments center upon what he calls “constitutional cases,” which may 
indeed contain a larger set of cases needing expensive handling. But the darker side 
of this greater expense in the federal courts obviously can be a problem even for 
the constitutional litigant, and in addition, it is a severe problem for many litigants 
in the vast majority of federal cases that do not pose constitutional questions but 
that still are forced to be treated by all the trappings of the expensive federal forum.  
Part of the problem, furthermore, is that the disadvantages imposed by expense 
and delay are not suffered by all litigants equally. The party with the burden of 
proof, or the party who depends upon the court to provide relief, is likely to be 
more disadvantaged. Thus, a plaintiff who simply wants to present a claim for 
personal injuries may be faced with delays and expense created by the defendant’s 
standard-form Motion for More Definite Statement, which occasions little cost to 
the defendant but great cost to the plaintiff. The law clerk may be delighted to work 
on that leading procedurally-oriented case in which the Supreme Court required 
plausibility in pleadings,55 an opinion that provides a field day for ambiguous 
arguments since it provides little guidance and since it arguably conflicts with the 
Federal Rules.56 The law clerk can justify a wide range of rulings about the 
specificity of pleadings in either simple or complex cases, so that the defendant can 
inexpensively create an issue that sparks a creative (meaning unpredictable and 
                                                                                                     
 53. David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their Judges, 69 JUDICATURE 
236, 236-37 (1986); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 
EMORY L.J. 1147, 1171 (1994) (containing an appellate judge’s conclusion that “the tendency has been 
for more and more of the opinion-drafting responsibility to be delegated to law clerks”) (quoting 
RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 104 (1985)).  
 54. See infra Part IV. B. 
 55. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 56. It provides little guidance because “plausibility” exists even if the pleadings are very general 
(perhaps more so), and thus the standard does not say how much specificity is required.  It conflicts with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Rule 84 provides that the annexed Federal Forms are 
examples of sufficiency, and the forms do not exhibit the kind of specificity that the Supreme Court 
demanded in Bell v. Twombly. 
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puzzling) decision spurred by the law clerk’s intellectual curiosity, producing a 
result that is very expensive for the plaintiff to navigate. And when this specificity-
of-the-pleadings exercise is over with no advancement of the merits, the war of 
attrition will continue, because the defendant will seek Daubert-Kumho hearings57 
about every one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses, in addition to a plethora of other 
kinds of procedural relief. The circumstances can, of course, be reversed, so that 
the defendant is the one to be run around the maypole with procedural issues to 
which there are only judgment-call answers.  The point is that diversity jurisdiction 
permits the passive-aggressive party, the one that opposes decision by driving up 
costs and delay, to obtain an advantage. 
D.  Bias:  Why Certain Parties Want a Federal Forum 
The unevenness of the impact due to the expense of federal litigation is related 
to yet a fourth underdeveloped argument against diversity: bias for and against 
categories of litigants that is unrelated to the purpose of preventing local prejudice. 
Professor Debra Lyn Bassett has shown that diversity has a negative impact upon 
rural parties, in a way that is unrelated to state-based prejudice; the federal courts 
give the advantage, in her view, to the urban litigant.58 And there are other ways in 
which the playing field tilts, upon removal, that are unrelated to the avoidance of 
in-state bias. In one of the Supreme Court’s recent removal decisions, Caterpillar 
Inc. v. Lewis,59 the parties engaged in a lengthy battle over precisely such an issue. 
The injured plaintiff wanted the case in state court because of a belief that the 
federal courts were more hostile to plaintiffs and more hospitable to defendants, 
irrespective of which state the respective litigants called home.60  Some defense 
lawyers in personal injury cases make it a policy routinely to remove virtually 
every lawsuit they can to the federal forum.  
So do defendants in employment law cases. These litigants believe that, 
completely aside from any alleged issues of local prejudice, the federal forum is 
inherently more pro-defendant. One newsletter that serves defense lawyers explains 
the underlying reasoning with startling clarity: 
Chant with us the following mantra: Federal court good; state court bad. 
With the rarest of exceptions, you are always better off in federal court.  Going 
there is not unlike visiting a cathedral.  The rules of evidence and procedure are 
more evenhanded; unlike their state court colleagues, federal judges have two law 
clerks to help analyze and deal with lawsuits; and the rules on setting aside a jury 
verdict are more favorable. 61 
                                                                                                     
 57. See David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s 
Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1 (2003) (asserting that the decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), “was intended to liberalize the admittance of evidence, but 
instead it has produced a minefield clogged with ‘Daubert hearings’ that are more lengthy, technical, 
and diffuse than anything that preceded them”). 
 58. Bassett, supra note 8, at 143-44. 
 59. 519 U.S. 61 (1996). 
 60. Id. at 75 n.14.   
 61. Fort Worth Federal Court Sends Federal Wage Claim to, Gasp, State Court, TEX. EMP. L. 
LETTER, June 1998, at 1. 
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Undoubtedly, the ability to impose higher costs upon plaintiffs serves 
defendants who prefer to litigate employment cases in expensive “cathedrals.” The 
degree to which federal courts tilt the playing field in favor of institutional 
defendants and against individuals, as compared to the state courts, even affects the 
constitutional cases that concern Professor Neuborne, because civil rights plaintiffs 
have increased their filings under Section 1983 in state courts,62 where they prefer 
both the efficiency and the differently leveled playing field to the atmosphere in the 
federal courts.  
IV.  CONFUSION AND DISTORTION AS NEW ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY 
The preceding section has discussed bad incentives that diversity creates.  The 
present section will explore a different kind of argument against diversity:  that it 
distorts the merits of the suit in ways unrelated to its purposes.  One reason is that 
the Twilight Zone nature of removal from state to federal courts has effects that 
distort.  Another is that in spite of the policy underlying the Erie Doctrine, diversity 
frustrates state law. 
A.  The Twilight Zone Effect of Removal 
The process of removal creates powerful arguments against diversity. Removal 
is a controlled accident, waiting to see the results it produces. The transition of a 
case from one court with a history in the litigation and with one set of procedures, 
to another court with a decidedly different set of procedures and with no history, is 
a recipe for unpredictable kinds of miscarriages. The traditional arguments against 
diversity jurisdiction include the complexity of jurisdictional law itself. But those 
traditional arguments understate the peculiar problems occasioned by the Twilight 
Zone effect of removal, which transcend mere complexity and affect substantive 
results. 
The Twilight Zone analogy is particularly apt given the possibility of 
overlapping simultaneous jurisdiction.  The removal law imposes a number of 
successive requirements for removal, but it leaves unclear the status of jurisdiction 
when some, but not all, steps have been completed.  The authorities are in conflict.  
In First National Bank in Little Rock v. Johnson & Johnson,63 the court held that 
removal was effected, and power transferred, with the first step, but in Beleos v. 
Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee,64 the court decided that power 
remained in the state court.  The Twilight Zone effect is compounded by holdings 
that a plaintiff may waive defective removal65 and that a defendant can later cure 
                                                                                                     
 62. For example, a recent Westlaw search of state-court cases in Texas yielded seventeen appellate 
cases in the first six months of 2008 construing the civil rights remedial statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2008).  Since these were all appellate cases, there must be many multiples of this number that were 
resolved in trial courts, or in other words, hundreds annually.  Presumably, plaintiffs in constitutional 
cases avoid federal courts for some of the same reasons they do so in employment cases, as is shown 
above.   
 63. 455 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Ark. 1978). 
 64. 161 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. S.C. 1956). 
 65. In fact, this is the effect of the thirty-day limit on plaintiff’s motion to remand for procedural 
defects.  See CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 225 n.3. 
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improper procedures.66  These doctrines are not subject to any time limit, meaning 
that the Twilight Zone theoretically can last indefinitely.67  The most significant 
problems arise when the state court concludes that it still has responsibility and 
therefore enters an order whose legality no one can predict.  At least one court has 
held that both state and federal courts have jurisdiction at the same time in the 
Twilight Zone,68 notwithstanding the likelihood of conflict. 
My own experience, limited as it is for a professor who participates in actual 
litigation only occasionally, has included a number of cases in which the presence 
of the litigation in two different courts was a bigger problem than the complexity of 
the governing law. (This is one reason for my surprise at John Frank’s assertion 
mentioned above, that there had been only one case in his career that involved a 
serious jurisdictional question.) One of my cases involved a post-trial removal. 
How many people have ever seen a case removed after a jury trial? Well, I have. In 
one of my cases, which never resulted in a written opinion, the plaintiff acceded to 
the manufacturer-defendant’s wishes on the eve of trial and nonsuited the local-
citizen distributor defendants, whose presence in the case, after all, had been only a 
strategy for retaining the case in state court and preventing removal. The case 
proceeded to trial in the state court, and it produced a disastrous result for the 
defendant: a plaintiff’s verdict in the high multi-millions of dollars. The state judge 
granted judgment on the verdict. Then, because the trial had consumed only 
twenty-eight days—less than the thirty-day window from the time of the dismissal 
of the local citizens in which the statutes authorized removal—the defendant 
concluded that it could lawfully remove the case after judgment, and for whatever 
reason (perhaps even to benefit from the inevitable confusion), it did so. 
If such a removal was lawful, it meant that the federal district judge would 
need to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in handling the post-trial 
motions to determine the outcome of a trial held under the Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the federal appellate court would face similar issues in applying the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to decide about a trial held under state rules.  
But there was nothing in the statutes that seemed to preclude the removal. This 
issue required a large volume of briefing unattached to any controlling authorities, 
together with tricky efforts by the plaintiff’s lawyer to avoid inadvertent waiver of 
a possibly improper removal (and efforts by the defense to precipitate precisely 
such a waiver). Ultimately the federal judge decided that the defendant’s 
participation in the trial of the case was itself a waiver, of the right to remove—a 
decision supported by little authority, but opposed by less—and he remanded the 
case to state court. Meanwhile, the passage of time under the applicable state rules 
meant that the state trial judge had lost jurisdiction of the case, and appeal was 
precluded under the terms of the rules. The defendant appealed out of time anyway, 
and to protect itself, the defendant also sought an injunction from the federal judge 
to prevent the state courts from refusing to hear its appeal. The federal trial judge 
granted the injunction for the stated purpose of protecting his jurisdiction, 
                                                                                                     
 66. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1996) (holding that even a substantively defective 
removal can be cured if jurisdiction exists at the time of judgment). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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prompting an appeal by the plaintiff’s lawyer in the federal court of appeals 
premised on the anti-injunction act; and meanwhile, the plaintiff opposed the 
defendant’s appeal in the state courts of the remanded case as untimely. Ultimately, 
these never-never land conditions produced a trans-substantive result: the parties’ 
settlement of the case, prompted in part by the inability of either side to predict 
anything. 
My cases also have included one that was a dispute between two 
subcontractors that manufactured spacecraft parts, controlled entirely by state law, 
but that the defendant removed on the theory that there was a generalized “federal 
interest” in space exploration that created federal jurisdiction. The result was 
expensive disclosures and discovery, including hearings to determine a myriad of 
questions about deposition issues, until the federal district judge decided that state-
law contract claims were not federal questions and remanded the case to the state 
court, meaning that much of the discovery had to be re-done.  
Then, I had a case involving a multiple-death explosion in Malaysia in which 
the defendants removed by claiming fraudulent joinder. Before the judge rejected 
the fraudulent joinder argument and remanded the case, again, there was extensive 
and expensive duplication of discovery. And in yet another of my cases, one party 
to a commercial dispute subject to settlement negotiations learned that the other 
was contemplating suit, and so it rushed to the state courthouse with its own suit 
framed to prevent removal, in the hope of establishing dominant jurisdiction. The 
other party succeeded in persuading a federal judge that the first suit had been filed 
in bad faith and successfully exercised dominant jurisdiction in the federal court 
instead. 
The abolition of diversity would not solve all of the problems associated with 
removal, of course. Federal question cases can be and frequently are filed in state 
courts, and the law permits defendants to remove these cases, as it should. But the 
volume of disasters occasioned by removal would be considerably reduced by the 
abolition of diversity, particularly since diversity provides more motivation for 
strategic joinder than federal question jurisdiction does. 
B.  The Substitution Effect: Why Frustration of State Policy Is Worse  
Than the Traditional Arguments Recognize 
My final argument against diversity is based on Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,69 but I have a variation on the traditional reasoning.  One of the existing 
problems that prompted the Erie decision was federal interference with state 
substantive policy. The Erie Court discussed Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,70 which it said had provoked 
widespread criticism for the doctrine that federal judges were “free to exercise an 
independent judgment as to what the common law of the State is—or should be.”71 
In the underlying case, Brown & Yellow Taxicab had an agreement with a railroad 
that gave it a monopoly; but the common law of Kentucky prohibited monopolies, 
and a suit in the Kentucky courts to enforce the monopoly would not have 
                                                                                                     
 69. 304 U.S. 64. 
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succeeded.72 Therefore, Brown & Yellow reincorporated under the law of 
Tennessee to create diversity, so that it could sue in federal court,73 and it obtained 
an injunction that prevented Black & White from competing.74 It thus perpetuated 
its monopoly and defeated the clearly expressed state policy of Kentucky.75  
The Erie Doctrine was intended to prevent this kind of haphazard federal 
interference with state substantive laws, and undoubtedly it has reduced it, but 
unfortunately, idiosyncratic federal decisions that counteract state policy remain a 
significant problem—and they provide an underdeveloped argument against 
diversity jurisdiction.  The traditional arguments against diversity include a 
perception that following state law is difficult, chancy, and imperfect for federal 
judges, but the traditional arguments assume that federal judges try to follow state 
law.  This argument against diversity is underdeveloped, however, because 
sometimes federal judges do not try to follow state law when they are required to.  
Instead, they sometimes substitute their own preferences. Federal judges hearing 
state law claims are supposed to act like ventriloquist’s dummies and parrot the 
words that a state judge would utter, exactly as the state judge would utter them. 
But federal judges do so imperfectly, and at times wander off the reservation 
completely, to do what they want to do, instead of trying to follow state law. 
Instead of acting as ventriloquist’s dummies, they become body snatchers. And the 
result is that diversity still motivates the evil to which the Erie decision was 
directed. The Brown & Yellow Taxicab result still happens. 
A particularly flagrant example is the litigation in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro 
Arts, Inc.76 Just for fun, Factors might be called “The Case of the Rawls 
Substitution,” because the federal court deliberately substituted the egalitarian 
views of the utopian philosopher John Rawls for the state law it was supposed to 
follow.77  The Factors case is all the more interesting because it featured not only 
John Rawls, but also Elvis Presley.  During his lifetime, Elvis formed a Tennessee 
corporation and assigned to it the right to the commercial use of his name and 
likeness.78 This bundle of rights is often referred to as “the right of publicity.”79 
After Elvis’s death, the defendant, Pro Arts, published and commercially sold Elvis 
posters.80 Elvis’s assigned corporation, Factors Etc., sued for an injunction against 
Pro Arts in federal court in New York.81 In defense, the alleged infringer, Pro Arts, 
argued that the right of publicity did not survive the death of the subject.82 The 
federal district judge granted the injunction, but Pro Arts appealed to the Second 
Circuit.83 That court concluded that Tennessee law was controlling, but it 
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 73. Id. at 521. 
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asserted—dubiously—that there was no helpful authority in Tennessee:  
“Tennessee statutory and decisional law affords no answer to the question.”84 
However, the Sixth Circuit had previously concluded that Tennessee would not 
recognize a post-mortem right of publicity.85 Since the Sixth Circuit included 
Tennessee, the Second Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit’s decision instead of 
doing the harder work of looking for Tennessee law.86 
The trouble was, the Sixth Circuit had invented its rationale for decision in 
complete disregard of Tennessee law. Judge Mansfield dissented from the Second 
Circuit’s decision on the ground that the Sixth Circuit had violated the Erie 
Doctrine and that the Second Circuit was perpetuating federal interference with 
Tennessee policy.87 Judge Mansfield quoted the Sixth Circuit’s sophistry:  
Since the case is one of first impression, we are left to review the question in light 
of practical and policy considerations .  .  . the relative weight of the conflicting 
interests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning death, 
privacy, inheritability, and economic opportunity. 88 
The Sixth Circuit law clerk who wrote these startling words—and it must have 
been a law clerk, if not an intern—went on to cite several inappropriate sources, 
including John Rawls’s utopian manifesto, A Theory of Justice.89 By his time, 
obviously, any thought of Tennessee common law was a distant speck in the law 
clerk’s rear view mirror. 
Several comments should be made about this reasoning. First, when the law of 
a state is unclear, the federal court is required to estimate state law. It is supposed 
to look to the decisions of the highest court of the state to find analogous decisions 
from which to draw its principles, not to John Rawls; and if there is nothing helpful 
even by analogy, the federal court is supposed to look to lower state court 
decisions. Informally, we say that the federal court makes an “Erie educated 
guess,” although the guess usually can be grounded somewhat in reality.90  The law 
clerk who wrote the Sixth Circuit’s decision did not even try, and neither did the 
Second Circuit.  The next point is that Judge Mansfield’s dissent did engage in 
some legal reasoning, unlike the majority’s mishmash. The majority’s result, he 
said, was “inconsistent with . . . nearly every other case which has considered the 
issue.”91 Third, Judge Mansfield confidently predicted that Tennessee would 
uphold the right of publicity after death (and disagree with the Rawls 
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substitution).92  Fourth, Judge Mansfield was right, and Tennessee promptly did as 
he predicted.93  
His prediction came true in the next chapter in the fight over poor Elvis’s right 
of publicity.  The decision issued from a lowly state trial court: the Chancery Court 
of Davidson County. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors94 was a suit by the estate of 
bluegrass giant Lester Flatt against Coors’s use of his likeness in two 
advertisements. One can be sure that the Davidson County Chancellor did not 
command the three-law-clerk army of each Second Circuit Judge in the Factors 
case, but contrary to the conclusions of Professor Neuborne,95 the absence of this 
lawless posse of supernumeraries was actually an advantage. In the Davidson 
County Chancery, nobody substituted John Rawls or the philosophy of A Theory of 
Justice.  Instead, the Chancellor read the parties’ briefs and considered some actual 
Tennessee law. “The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that the exclusive 
right to use a trade name can survive the termination of business by a business 
entity which used it,” he wrote.96   Also, “The Tennessee Court of Appeals held 
that the exclusive right to use the name of a Memphis drugstore passed from the 
sole proprietor to his widow who continued to operate the business.”97  It could 
have been a pretty clear step from these analogous authorities to an Erie educated 
guess that would recognize a post-mortem right of publicity, if the Sixth and 
Second Circuits had bothered, but they did not. The chancellor excoriated the 
Factors decision and agreed with Judge Mansfield’s dissent: 
Judge Mansfield makes a pointedly perceptive comment when he said “it would be 
rational for Tennessee courts to adopt a policy enhancing the continued growth of 
Nashville and Memphis as centers for the lives and activities of music industry 
personalities.” . . . This Court agrees with Judge Mansfield. It would be 
unreasonable not to protect the efforts and energies of so many Tennessee artists.98   
Highly-educated federal law clerks, enamored with Rawls’s controversial 
philosophy, did not produce a higher level of performance in this instance. Instead, 
they undoubtedly were a hindrance. 
So what finally happened in Factors? The Living Elvis case was still pending. 
It had been remanded to the federal district judge, the one who had originally 
granted the injunction, and he gained new conviction in the rightness of that result 
from reading Commerce Union Bank v. Coors. Having received the order of his 
appellate court, he had no authority to re-grant the injunction, but he took the 
unusual step of staying his decision to allow the Second Circuit to recall its 
mandate.99 The Second Circuit reconsidered—and amazingly, came out with the 
same decision: no post-mortem right of publicity.100 Without trying to follow the 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 288. 
 93. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors of the Cumberland, Inc., 7 MEDIA L. RPTR. 2204 (Chan. Ct. 
Davidson Cty. Tenn. 1981). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Neuborne, supra note 52, at 1122. 
 96. Commerce Union Bank, 7 MEDIA L. RPTR. at 2206. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2208. 
 99. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (on remand). 
 100. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1983). 
20 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
Supreme Court and appellate decisions that the Davidson chancellor had found, the 
court sidestepped the question whether Commerce Union had “sufficient 
authoritativeness” and declared again that the authorities conflicted.101 Again, 
Judge Mansfield dissented.102  Today, of course, it is well established that the right 
of publicity survives death in Tennessee.103  Elvis lives, and he will live forever. 
How prevalent is this pattern of lawlessness? It would take a study far beyond 
the scope of this Article to answer that question. It is not too much to assert, 
however, that diversity jurisdiction contributes to the frustration of state policy. It 
does so still, in spite of the Erie Doctrine and its explicit disapproval of federal 
judges who decide what state law “should be.” The traditional arguments against 
diversity make a valid point in criticizing the waste, confusion, and delay created 
by federal decisions of state law. The point here is that the reality is even worse 
than the traditional arguments recognize, because it includes not just complexity, 
but outlandish nullification of the law. The Brown & Yellow Taxicab case is still 
with us, in the form of decisions such as those in the Case of the Living Elvis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Diversity jurisdiction cannot do much to achieve its alleged purposes. As the 
traditional arguments indicate, the judge is a local citizen, and so are the jurors. The 
assumption that these local citizens will be differently biased, merely because the 
courthouse in which they sit is a few blocks from the state courthouse, has little to 
commend it. Second, the law of diversity defeats its own purposes, because it does 
not allow for a federal forum when diversity is incomplete. Thus, the federal 
courthouse closes whenever a local plaintiff joins any local citizen as one of 
multiple defendants, even if a diverse defendant is the real target. In that situation, 
if local prejudice really were a valid concern, one would expect that the diverse 
defendant would need a federal forum even more than in cases with complete 
diversity, because, by hypothesis, the judge and jury would be infected by 
xenophobia, and the two local citizens would collaborate strategically to direct all 
biases at the foreigner. Third, the plaintiff can usually destroy diversity by the 
simple device of adding superfluous defendants who happen to be local citizens: a 
strategy that creates its own pathologies. And fourth, communications and mobility 
today are vastly different than they were at the time of the nation’s founding, or 
even a few years ago; and as a result, an inhabitant of Los Angeles is likely to have 
more in common with a Bostonian of similar characteristics than either would have 
with a co-citizen of different social status or lifestyle.  
The traditional arguments against diversity also feature the complexity 
inherent in the jurisprudence of diversity, which involves expenditures of private 
and judicial resources that do not advance dispute resolution on the merits. Then 
too, the traditional arguments emphasize the friction between state and federal laws 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 13. 
 103. Tenn. ex rel Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1987) (rejecting the Second Circuit’s interpretation).  This decision has even been followed by the errant 
Sixth Circuit, which so boldly had ignored Tennessee law.  See Dominion Trust Co. of Tenn. v. United 
States, 7 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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that diversity creates. Furthermore, there is the argument that diversity contributes 
to delay and crowding in the federal courts, so that litigants with true federal claims 
cannot have their suits heard promptly.   
These arguments have merit, but this Article has sought to demonstrate that the 
traditional debate has left other arguments undeveloped. It has failed adequately to 
examine the dysfunctional incentives that diversity jurisdiction brings about. For 
example, there is the Race to the Bottom that results when a litigant with a weak 
case deliberately selects the more arbitrary forum precisely because arbitrariness is 
an advantage for the party that anticipates a loss on the merits. This Article calls 
this phenomenon the Ice Bowl Effect. Then, too, diversity jurisdiction creates a 
motivation for plaintiffs to add superfluous defendants: parties against which these 
plaintiffs really have no desire of recovery, but which they add merely to destroy 
diversity. This Article refers to this result as Harassing the Little Guy. Also, the 
increased cost of federal litigation gives an edge to obstructionists. This advantage 
goes to the kind of party that this Article calls the Passive-Aggressive Litigant. And 
finally, the transition to federal court induces new kinds of bias, so that many 
lawyers for institutional parties in personal injury or employment litigation 
routinely remove these cases, believing that the result will be what this Article 
labels a Tilted Playing Field against individual plaintiffs. 
In addition, the traditional debate understates how much diversity jurisdiction 
distorts the substantive law. It increases the number of removals, and removals are 
inherently prone to distortion. They create what this article refers to as the Twilight 
Zone Effect, which arises when two different kinds of trial courts handle the same 
litigation. And in spite of the Erie Doctrine, diversity jurisdiction results in 
frustrating state policy. This Article illustrates the result by what it calls the Case of 
the Living Elvis. 
The abolition of general diversity jurisdiction of the kind featured in Section 
1332 would not mean the abolition of all jurisdiction founded on diversity. There 
are reasons other than local prejudice that can support the grant of power to federal 
courts.104 There are at least three types of cases in which diversity may be justified 
on grounds unrelated to the local prejudice rationale. First, there are cases in which 
large numbers of very similar claims would otherwise be dispersed throughout 
many States, producing wastefully duplicative litigation. An example is litigation 
relating to a transportation disaster, such as the crash of an intercity aircraft. The 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act addresses this issue, but it is narrowly 
limited in its effect.105 Abolition of general diversity jurisdiction would allow for 
expansion of the Act so that it would better achieve its purposes. Second, types of 
litigation that are subject to perceived abuses in peculiar venues might be treated 
advantageously by diversity jurisdiction. The removal provisions of the Class 
Action Fairness Act are an example.106 Third, the federal courts might be an 
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 106. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006). 
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appropriate forum for particularly complex cases in which the “amount in 
controversy” is very large. Today, a suit in the multiple hundreds of thousands of 
dollars would not fit this description; indeed, a suit for a $1 million might not be 
better handled by a more expensive and more complicated court. An increase in the 
required amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction to, say, $10 million, 
would achieve this result.107 In such a situation, the greater expense of litigating in 
a federal forum, one in which the judge has two law clerks and perhaps even an 
army of interns, might be justified by the returns to scale.  
In suits of average or even modestly large size, however, the dysfunctional 
incentives and distortions brought about by diversity jurisdiction significantly 
outweigh any conceivable benefits. The newer arguments developed in this Article 
show that federal power should be confined to cases in which its exercise serves 
purposes other than those attributed in the distant past to diversity jurisdiction, and 
it should be authorized only in situations in which it causes fewer disadvantages. 
Today, more than ever, there are persuasive arguments for the abolition or 
retrenchment of the general diversity statute.  
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